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Civil Procedure
Personal Jurisdiction After Ford
Scott Dodson1
The March 2021 decision of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District2 completes the triangulation of specific
personal jurisdiction under the Constitution. Combined with the
Court’s recent narrowing of general jurisdiction and its
longstanding adherence to tag jurisdiction and consent-based
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction in the United States is beginning
to exhibit contours that are more defined and concrete. What does
this state of personal jurisdiction mean for future developments?
This chapter offers an answer.
Personal Jurisdiction Until Ford
Personal jurisdiction until 1945 was governed by notions of
physical presence and territorial sovereignty.3 Under this regime,
individual defendants could be sued in the states where they
resided, where they were personally served, and where they
consented to personal jurisdiction through voluntary appearance
in the forum court.4 Those justifications for personal jurisdiction
persist to this day. The consent basis for jurisdiction has even
expanded beyond voluntary appearance in the forum court to
include ex ante consent by contract.5
The 1945 case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington6
marked a dramatic expansion of the doctrine to allow personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents—especially business entities—
when they had sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum
state, such that personal jurisdiction in the forum would not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”7 The
1

Excerpted and adapted from Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction,
Comparativism, and Ford, 51 STETSON L. REV. 187 (2021).
2
141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
3
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 722 (1878).
4
Id. at 729.
5
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
6
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7
Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court thus loosened personal jurisdiction from moorings anchored
solely on physical presence in the forum state, and it adopted an
additional “minimum contacts” test for personal jurisdiction
founded on activities, effects, and fairness.
Subsequent opinions distilled this standard into two species of
personal jurisdiction: general (all-purpose) jurisdiction and
specific (case-linked) jurisdiction.8 Until 2014, the development
of specific jurisdiction was episodic and ad hoc. The Court
required that the defendant’s forum contacts had to give rise to or
be related to the plaintiff’s cause of action, but the Court did not
establish how directly connected to the forum the defendant’s
conduct had to be,9 nor did the Court define how related to the
cause of action the defendant’s forum contacts had to be.10 The
Court articulated catchphrases as guideposts: the defendant had to
“purposefully avail[]”11 itself of the forum state, such that it could
“reasonably foresee[]” causing harm there.12 The Court also noted,
in specific-jurisdiction cases, that personal jurisdiction
encompassed five “fairness factors,” which could raise or lower
the minimum level of contacts needed to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.13
In 2014, the Court decided a series of cases that attempted to
clarify the contours of specific jurisdiction’s minimum-contacts
test. These cases have accentuated the Court’s pronouncement
that specific jurisdiction depends upon the “relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”14 Geometrically, the
contours of this formulation are triangular, with the claim, the

8

Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2018).
9
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
10
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418
(1984).
11
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
12
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980).
13
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The five
fairness factors are the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining effective relief, the interest of the forum state, the policies of
other states or nations, and the judicial system’s interest in efficiency.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–15.
14
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
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forum, and the defendant’s conduct at the apex of each triangle
point, as shown below:
FORUM

DEFENDANT’S
CONDUCT

CLAIM

In Walden v. Fiore,15 the Court considered the left side of the
triangle: the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
forum. There, the defendant, a Georgia police officer, seized cash
from Las Vegas poker players when the players arrived at the
Atlanta airport on a layover stop during a flight from Puerto Rico
to Nevada. The players sued the officer in Nevada for wrongfully
seizing their cash. The Court held that even though the officer may
have known that the poker players were from Nevada and that they
would have suffered harm in Nevada from not having access to
their cash, Nevada could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
the officer because his conduct was not sufficiently connected to
Nevada.16 The Court stated that the defendant’s conduct must be
connected to the forum state by more than just the plaintiffs’
connections; rather, the connection between the defendant and the
forum must be created by “contacts that the ‘defendant himself’
creates with the forum.”17 Walden is thus a refinement of the more
generalized “purposeful availment” test.18
15

571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
Id. at 288–89.
17
Id. at 284.
18
Another key case on this side of the triangle is World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
16
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In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,19
the Court tackled the right side of the triangle: the relationship
between the claim and the forum. Plaintiffs from around the
country sued Bristol-Myers Squibb in California state court for
injuries resulting from their ingestion of the drug Plavix, which
Bristol-Myers Squibb sold nationwide through a California
distributor. Plaintiffs claimed to have obtained, taken, and been
injured by the drug in their home states. The non-California
plaintiffs argued that California had personal jurisdiction over
Bristol-Myers Squibb for their claims because Bristol-Myers
Squibb had significant contacts involving Plavix in California.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument. Although the
California court clearly had personal jurisdiction over BristolMyers Squibb for the California plaintiffs’ claims, the nonCalifornia plaintiffs’ claims were different: “The mere fact that
other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in
California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the
nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”20 According to the
Court, “[w]hat is needed—and what is missing here—is a
connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”21
After Bristol-Myers Squibb, “specific jurisdiction requires a direct
link between not only between the forum and the defendant but
also between the forum and the claim.”22
Walden and Bristol-Myers Squibb helped clarify the two sides
of the triangle but did not address the base of the triangle.
Previously, the Court had set out the legal test there: that the claim
“must arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts.23 “Arise
out of” suggests causality, which many of the prior specificjurisdiction cases easily satisfied. But the Court had never decided
what other kinds of contacts might also satisfy the conduct-claimconnection requirements of this part of the triangle.

19

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
Id. at 1781.
21
Id.
22
Dodson, supra note 8, at 17.
23
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984).
20
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Ford and the Triangulation of Specific Jurisdiction
In March 2021, the Court completed the triangulation of
specific jurisdiction. In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District,24 the Supreme Court considered what contacts
were related enough to the cause of action to count for purposes
of minimum contacts. Ford resolved two separate cases. In one
case, a Montana resident died after an accident while driving her
1996 Ford Explorer in Montana. In the other, a Minnesota resident
riding in a 1994 Ford Crown Victoria was seriously injured in an
accident in Minnesota. Both plaintiffs sued Ford in their home
states for state-law claims under specific jurisdiction. Because
Ford is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan,
Ford moved to dismiss both complaints for lack of personal
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The evidence revealed that Ford directly targeted Montana
with marketing efforts for Explorers through its advertising in the
state, its 36 dealerships in the state, its sales of Explorers and their
parts in the state, and its repair, replacement, and recall services
for Explorers in the state. The evidence revealed that Ford directly
targeted Minnesota with marketing efforts related to Crown
Victorias through its marketing and advertising in Minnesota, its
84 dealerships in Minnesota, and its sale of thousands of 1994
Crown Victorias in Minnesota. With respect to both states, Ford
both encouraged owners to keep their Fords for many years after
purchase and encouraged a robust resale market for its vehicles in
those states. Thus, there was no dispute that Ford did substantial
business in both Montana and Minnesota related to the types of
vehicles at issue.25
Nevertheless, Ford argued that the courts hearing these cases
lacked specific jurisdiction over Ford because Ford did not design,
manufacture, or sell, in the forum states, the particular cars
involved in the accidents.26 Ford designed that Explorer in
Michigan, manufactured it in Kentucky, and sold it in
Washington. Ford designed that Crown Victoria in Michigan,
manufactured it in Canada, and sold it in North Dakota. Ford had
no direct involvement in bringing those cars into Montana and
24

141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
Id. at 1026.
26
Id. at 1019.
25
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Minnesota.27 According to Ford, therefore, those states’ courts
could not exercise specific jurisdiction over Ford in those lawsuits
because Ford’s conduct in those states was unrelated to the claim.
The Supreme Court rejected Ford’s argument and held that
the Montana and Minnesota courts could exercise specific
jurisdiction over Ford in those cases.28 Justice Kagan, writing for
four other justices, reiterated the modern triumvirate: personal
jurisdiction depends upon the connections between the claims, the
defendant’s conduct, and the forum state.29 She quickly dispensed
with the left and right sides of the triangle. The claims were
connected to the forum states because, unlike the nonresident
claims in Bristol-Myers Squibb, who were not injured in
California, the Ford plaintiffs were residents of and were injured
in the forum states.30 Further, Ford’s conduct had substantial
connections with the forum states because, unlike in Walden, Ford
purposefully (and systematically) availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business activities in both states.31
The Court then turned to the base of the specific-jurisdiction
triangle. Was Ford’s forum conduct sufficiently related to the
claims at issue? The Court answered yes: “Ford had systematically
served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles
that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those
States.”32 Accordingly, Ford’s substantial conduct in the forum
states pertaining to the types of cars at issue in the accidents were
related to the claims.33
Ford thus completes the triangle. Each modern case—
Walden, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Ford—supplies clearer
standards for each of the triangle’s sides, as depicted below.

27

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1032.
29
Id. at 1024.
30
Id. at 1031.
31
Id. at 1026, 1031.
32
Id. at 1028.
33
Id. at 1032.
28
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Six Observations After Ford
I offer six observations about Ford and the future of specific
jurisdiction. First, Ford does little to clarify whether the five
fairness factors are still good law and, if so, how they operate
within the specific-jurisdiction framework. In Burger King and
Asahi, the Court treated the fairness factors as a bifurcated
analysis that could raise or lower the minimum-contacts bar.
Bristol-Myers Squibb took a different track; although the Court
referred to “a variety of interests,” including the plaintiff’s choice
of forum and the forum’s interests, it focused on the “burden on
the defendant,” which it phrased in terms of “the practical
problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive
power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the
claims in question.”34 Bristol-Myers Squibb then focused on that
latter point, which it equated with the side of the triangle
connecting the forum to the claim.35
Ford is even vaguer about the fairness factors. It neither
mentions them by name nor analyzes them as a separate group.36
34

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017) (internal quotations omitted).
35
Id. at 1781.
36
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25.
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Ford does, during its discussion, obliquely refer to three of them
in ways scattered throughout the opinion. First, as for the burden
on the defendant, “allowing jurisdiction in these cases treats Ford
fairly.”37 Second, as for the interest of the plaintiff, “the plaintiffs
brought suit in the most natural State.”38 Finally, as for the forum
states’ interests, “[t]hose States have significant interests at
stake.”39 After Ford, it is unclear whether the fairness factors
retain their status as a discrete inquiry, what work they do in the
test, and whether all of them are still good law.
Second, because Ford did not implicate nettlesome issues of
virtual contacts and complications of technology, the majority did
not consider whether current doctrine was up to the challenges of
the technology age. The elephant in the room continues to be the
Internet, and the doctrine will not truly be settled until the Court
considers how specific jurisdiction applies to virtual contacts.
Third, the Court backed away from the debate aired in J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro between a consent-based theory
of personal jurisdiction and a fairness-based theory of personal
jurisdiction.40 Ford sidestepped both theories and instead framed
personal jurisdiction in terms of reciprocity (purposeful
availment) and notice (reasonable foreseeability):
Our decision in International Shoe founded specific jurisdiction
on an idea of reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When
(but only when) a company “exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state”—thus “enjoying the
benefits and protection of its laws”—the State may hold the
company to account for related misconduct. Later decisions
have added that our doctrine similarly provides defendants with
“fair warning”—knowledge that a “particular activity may
37

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1031.
39
Id. at 1030.
40
Compare J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880
(2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (dispensing with “[f]reeform notions of
fundamental fairness” in favor of acts that manifest an intention to
“submit to a State’s authority”), with id. at 901–02 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the plurality’s notion that consent is the
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this
Court” and instead interpreting precedent to “g[i]ve prime place to
reason and fairness”).
38
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subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” A
defendant can thus structure its primary conduct to lessen or
avoid exposure to a given State’s courts.41

Fourth, the Court reaffirmed personal jurisdiction’s
connection to interstate federalism, a principle that had seemingly
been put to rest in 198242 before being awakened by Bristol-Myers
Squibb.43 As the Court in Ford put it:
And this Court has considered alongside defendants’ interests
those of the States in relation to each other. One State’s
“sovereign power to try” a suit, we have recognized, may
prevent “sister States” from exercising their like authority. The
law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with
“little legitimate interest” in a suit do not encroach on States
more affected by the controversy.44

Fifth, Justice Gorsuch penned a concurring opinion, decrying
the current test as divorced from an originalist view of personal
jurisdiction, as prone to vagaries in application, and as providing
special treatment to artificial entities.45 Justice Gorsuch even
seems willing to consider reviving the old “doing business”
heuristic as a proxy for corporate “presence.”46 The Court rejected
that proposition as inconsistent with the limits of specific
jurisdiction,47 but Justice Gorsuch’s point was to invite a
rethinking of the entire doctrine in line with originalism rather
than precedent. It remains to be seen just how many justices are
willing to embark on a course that would jettison more than
seventy-five years of precedent.

41

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (internal citations omitted).
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 n.10 (1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power
described in World-Wide Volkswagen . . . must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause.”).
43
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
44
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (internal citations omitted).
45
Id. at 1035, 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
47
Id. at 1027 n.3.
42
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Sixth, an important takeaway is what the Court didn’t do.
Ford was an easy case. Ford’s contacts in the forum state were
significant; no unfairness in terms of burdens or expectations
could possibly be argued. And the cause of action arose there. As
Alito suggested, Ford’s contacts may even have proximately
caused the injuries to occur there because of Ford’s efforts to make
sure people, like the plaintiffs, drove their Ford vehicles in those
states.48 So the Court’s rejection of Ford’s argument against
personal jurisdiction was, if not surprising, of profound
importance. Had Ford’s argument been successful, specific
jurisdiction would have been dramatically narrowed. Few cases
would meet all three sides of the triangle. Companies could game
the market by selling into only one state while advertising and
promoting in all of them, thereby reaping the benefits of those
many states’ markets without being subject to suit there.
Ultimately, the biggest effect of Ford may end up being its
rejection of Ford’s restrictive theory of specific jurisdiction.
*

48

*

Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring).

*

